

Présentation du cours



Présentation du cours

- **Déroulé du TD de L3 S6 L.V. Anglais**
- **Bibliographie**
- **Modalités de contrôle des connaissances**
- **Introduction**

Présentation du cours

- **Déroulé du TD de L3 L.V. Anglais**
 - ✓ Contact : morgane.augris@univ-orleans.fr
 - ✓ Descriptif du cours

Absences

- La présence au TD est obligatoire.
- Appel toutes les semaines.
- En cas d'absence justifiée, vous disposez de 5 jours pour transmettre le motif ou le certificat.
- À partir de 20 % d'absence au TD, vous serez considéré comme ABI.



UNIVERSITÉ D'ORLÉANS

Orléans / Bourges / Blois / Chartres / Châteauroux / Issoudun / Tours Fondettes



Bilan des sanctions prononcées par la commission de discipline

Sébastien Ringuedé
VP CFVU

Novembre 2025



Rapide bilan

9 étudiants ont été convoqués en commission de discipline pour faux et usage de faux certificats médicaux

Sanction maximum : **Exclusion de 6 mois de l'université**

33 étudiants ont été convoqués pour possession ou usage d'un téléphone portable lors d'un examen.



Sanctions : **Exclusions de 6 mois / de 12 mois avec sursis de l'université**

5 étudiants ont été convoqués pour plagiat

Sanctions : **Exclusions de 6 mois avec sursis, exclusions de 6 mois ferme**

Présentation du cours

• Bibliographie





Célène :

« Anglais maths Semestre 6 »

Bas de page : TD AUGRIS

Présentation du cours

- Bibliographie**



Célène :

« Anglais maths Semestre 6 »

Bas de page : TD AUGRIS

Groupe verbal :

1. Oubli du -s à la troisième personne du singulier du présent (forme simple et formes auxiliées), ainsi que tout autre erreur de conjugaison de base (*you is)
2. Les verbes irréguliers
3. Les constructions auxiliées, en particulier *have + en, be + ing, be + en*
4. Forme du verbe après un auxiliaire de modalité

Groupe nominal :

1. Les adjectifs : invariables et placés avant le nom qu'ils qualifient
2. "article zéro" (= pas d'article) devant les noms "abstrait" (*life, death, nature...*) et les noms propres, y compris accompagnés d'un titre
3. Les noms à pluriel irrégulier (*teeth, children...*)
4. Les pronoms : respecter l'accord en genre et en nombre avec l'antécédent

Syntaxe :

1. Construction des phrases négatives
2. Construction des questions, directes et indirectes
3. Ordre Verbe-Objet-Adverbe dans la phrase simple (ex : *He likes coffee very much*)

NB : La présence dans une copie de trois erreurs dans ces rubriques entraîne une baisse de 20% de la note globale.

Présentation du cours

- **Modalités de contrôle des connaissances**

Modalités de contrôle des connaissances :

Contrôle continu

***Etudiants régime général :**

1 devoir de CC1 (séance 6 – CE/CO/Cours) : 50 %

1 devoir de CC2 (séances 7 et 8 – oral – présence obligatoire) : 50 %

***Etudiants régime spécial :**

1 examen terminal (écrit 1h – fin du semestre)

Les notes ne se négocient pas.

Science in Society : A Matter of Sense and Sensibility

- **Science** has an **impact on society**
- But **science** is also **impacted by society** and its **bias**, because scientists belong to society and as individuals, they have **internalized** sometimes flawed **representations**
 - > there is no pure objectivity in science, and one must be aware of their influences, distorted views sometimes, to be better as a scientist or a researcher

Examples:

Presentations at the end of the semester could focus on a **case study** about an example of **science** or experimentation which was **deliberately delayed or hindered because of outdated social norms** or issues.

One might also discuss **unconscious bias or discriminations still present in science** that plague some scientists, and even think about ways to overcome those obstacles through **education**, or effective **awareness campaigns** to be imagined.

You might also want to pay attention to particular **wrongs in society, cultural discriminations or injustices that scientists are working to redress**, whether the social issues be contemporary or not.

You may show that **science evolves with society**, or that **society evolves with science**.

- A final question would be the **perception of science itself in society** – which may constitute an obstacle. Some prejudices about science must be fought so scientists can still do their jobs in the future. So what about the image of science in society?

Science in Society : A Matter of Sense and Sensibility

Should we beware of science because its capabilities are so life-threatening? Or should we cherish science because it is so precious? Or, alternatively, should we transform science into a life-affirming pursuit by caring labour? All three, says Patsy Hallen.

Science in Society : A Matter of Sense and Sensibility

WE NEED TO BE careful of science because of its life-destroying potential. Half of all scientists and technologists work on war-related research while a third work for large corporations, mainly in teams on profit-motivated research projects not of their own choosing. Science has become incorporated into the military-industrial complex and often serves the interests of profit-making and social control.

The mind-set of our age is that science is neutral and value-free. But


this picture of science functions as a smokescreen. It succeeds in directing our attention away from facts about the social structure of science and its practices. The discourse of value-neutrality performs an ideological service in favour of the status quo and prevents us for examining how science is actually organised (its take-over by the military-industrial complex, its social stratification, its exclusion of female practitioners, its culture, gender and species biases) and what science actually does

Science in Society : A Matter of Sense and Sensibility

Human values and interests shape science in the following ways:

- the selection of goals for science;
- the choice of problems and research projects on which science concentrates;
- the methodologies and knowledge-producing practices of science;
- the choice of experimental design;
- the way we behave towards our research subjects;
- the language we use (for example, the terminology, the 'hard' sciences: are women less well-equipped to penetrate nature's secrets?);
- the very content of our theoretical formulations in science;
- the evaluation and interpretation of scientific results; and
- whom we consider as scientists (depending on one's gender or class, identical work earns the label of lab assistant or scientist).

Science in Society : A Matter of Sense and Sensibility



« Unmannered dog, stand thou when I command ! »

« If ever he have child, abortive be it,
Prodigious, and untimely brought to light,
Whose ugly and unnatural aspect
May fright the hopeful mother at the view »

« – Blush, blush, thou lump of foul deformity »

« Thou elvish-marked, abortive, rooting hog,
Thou that wast sealed in thy nativity
The slave of nature and the son of hell ;
Thou slander of thy heavy mother's womb,
Thou loathed issue of thy father's loins,
Thou rag of honour, thou detested – »


« Hie thee to hell for shame, and leave this world,
Thou cacodemon. There thy kingdom is. »

« Never hung poison on a fouler toad.
Out of my sight ! Thou dost infect mine eyes.
[...]
Would they were basilisks, to strike thee dead. »

« Vouchsafe, diffused infection of a man »


« Fouler than heart can think thee, thou canst make
No excuse current but to hang thyself »

Science in Society : A Matter of Sense and Sensibility



| Common points regarding form | Common points regarding content | Your guess |
|------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------|
| | | |

Politics : From Propaganda to Democracy

| Common points regarding form | Common points regarding content | Your guess |
|---|---|--|
| <p>Lines (in verse), addressed to one person > probably a theatrical play</p> <p>Words in early modern English ("thou," "thee," "thy", "dost") > work of an English playwright from the Renaissance</p> <p>Pentameter, most of the time iambic, and unrhymed verse (blank verse) > probably a play by Shakespeare, about noble characters</p> | <p>Insults and curses</p> <p>Accusing the target of being an animal ("hog", "dog", "toad"), a monster or a demon ("elvish-marked" "son of hell" "cacodemon"), in other words inhuman ("infection of a man", "fouler" "detested")</p> <p>Abuse specifically focuses on physical appearance ("ugly", "unnatural aspect", "lump of foul deformity" "Thou dost infect mine eyes")</p> <p>Mention of a kingdom</p> <p>> probably a Shakespearean play about a cruel king who is said to be devilish and suffers from physical disabilities</p> | <p>William Shakespeare's Richard III</p>  |

[illegible]

Politics : From Propaganda to Democracy

List of charges held by William Shakespeare against Richard III:

[illegible]

2. Does the summary help you understand all the abuse regarding his physical appearance? Why does Shakespeare insist upon the way he looks? To what extent does it account for a specific vision of the cosmos in the Renaissance?

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Politics : From Propaganda to Democracy

1. Read the summary of Shakespeare's play Richard III and briefly rephrase in your own words what happens: what crimes could Richard be accused of? Make a list of all the charges that could be held against him.



List of charges held by William Shakespeare against Richard III:

- He betrayed his brother Clarence so he was sent to prison (without his knowing it was because of Richard) and hired assassins to kill him while he was there.
- He killed the husband (and father-in-law actually) of Anne Neville, before marrying her.
- As he became Lord Protector after the death of his brother the king (Edward IV), he locked up his nephews, Edward V and his brother, in the Tower of London.
- Then he told everybody they were illegitimate children, so he could access the throne instead.
- He eventually had the "Princes in the tower" killed.
- He sent Hastings to jail (and had him killed).
- He suffered from physical deformity (he was notably pictured as a hunchback).
- He was evil.
- He had Buckingham killed.
- Before killing the sons of the Queen (Elizabeth Woodville, his late brother the King's wife), he had gotten rid of her brothers (and who knows, maybe of the King himself).
- Richard killed his wife, so he could court and try to get married to his niece (to secure the throne).
- Basically, he is accused of killing anybody who disagrees with him and might prevent him from usurping the throne.

2. Does the summary help you understand all the abuse regarding his physical appearance?


Why does Shakespeare insist upon the way he looks?

To what extent does it account for a specific vision of the cosmos in the Renaissance?

His inhumanity is supposed to show physically ("inner crookedness represented externally" "disability caused by inner evil"). The Renaissance insists on the connection and reflection of all elements: inner worth is supposed to show externally, and human (dis)order is echoed by natural (dis)order.

Politics : From Propaganda to Democracy

3. Let's check the historical and scientific veracity of some of the charges held by Shakespeare against Richard III with the following video, entitled "Facts about Richard III: History's Most Reviled King." (01:04-06:27 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PzntL4tn3II>)



Which charge(s) have actually been proven true by historians and scientists?

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
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4. Spot at least one joke in the video (whether you find it funny or not).

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5. Let's try and answer Hastings's question: "WHY [IS RICHARD] SO EVIL?". In other words, why does Shakespeare portray him as a monster more than one century after his death (1593)?

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
6. How does the play Richard III by Shakespeare demonstrate the performative power of words, here overpowering history and science?

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Politics : From Propaganda to Democracy




Which charge(s) have actually been proven true by historians and scientists?

Richard had his nephews declared illegitimate and he imprisoned them in the Tower of London (under the guise of protection): that is the only thing historians know for sure.

Actually, he probably wasn't a hunchback. If the blood of his nephews might be on his hands, there is no historical evidence. He was accused of killing his wife, but tuberculosis is the most likely culprit. And despite rumours that Richard killed his wife to marry his niece, Elizabeth of York, he never made a move on her – on the contrary he courted Princess Joana of Portugal.

4. Spot at least one joke in the video (whether you find it funny or not).

Examples: Parking over 24hrs, that's going to be a big fee; Locking up children in the tower is not good PR (public relations) ; Children have been discovered in a chamber that had been walled-up > not a good place to grow up in ; Repetition of "illegitimate" ; Richard's courting of Joana hit a snag when he died on the battlefield.



5. Let's try and answer Hastings's question: "WHY [IS RICHARD] SO EVIL?". In other words, why does Shakespeare portray him as a monster more than one century after his death (1593)?

Shakespeare wrote his play under the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, the granddaughter of Henry Tudor, who became King Henry VII after defeating Richard III at the battle of Bosworth Field. The idea behind Tudor propaganda is to legitimize the Tudor dynasty by portraying the previous king as devilish ("Eager to legitimize the Tudor dynasty, propagandists denounced Richard as a devilish usurper").

6. How does the play Richard III by Shakespeare demonstrate the performative power of words, here overpowering history and science?

Through his play, Shakespeare created the monstrous image we still have of Richard III, without concerns for historical truth.

Politics : From Propaganda to Democracy




Politics : From Propaganda to Democracy

Relationship Between Electoral System and Mathematics in Contemporary Areas :

- **Designing different voting methods**
 - ✓ Majority, first-past-the-post, proportional representation, ranked-choice voting (arithmetic)
 - ✓ Mathematical formulas for seat allocation
- **Analysis and evaluation to make sure elections are transparent, fair and logical**
 - ✓ Counting methods, error checking
 - ✓ Detecting irregularities and minimizing bias
 - ✓ Determining the good and bad sides of the system: decision-making and policy planning
 - ✓ Drawing the boundaries of voter areas (geometry, statistics, graph theory)
- **Predicting voter behaviour and outcomes through modeling**
 - ✓ Opinion polls, surveys and historical voting data
 - ✓ Statistical analysis
 - ✓ Simulations and probabilistic models (predicting results, testing voting methods)
 - ✓ Predicting election outcomes and “what-if” scenarios (predictive models, regression analysis, machine learning, Bayesian statistics)
 - ✓ Campaign strategy (game theory)

Politics : From Propaganda to Democracy



Politics : From Propaganda to Democracy



The screenshot shows the homepage of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). The header includes the AAAS logo and navigation links: GIVE, RESOURCE CENTER, PROGRAMS, NEWS, EVENTS, MEMBER LOGIN, and JOIN. Below the header is a secondary navigation bar with links: WHO WE ARE, WHAT WE DO, GET INVOLVED, and MEMBERSHIP, followed by a search icon. The main content area features a breadcrumb trail "HOME | NEWS" and a large headline: "Mathematicians and a Political Scientist Use Science to Improve the U.S. Voting System". Below the headline, the date "14 February 2020" and the author "by: Anne Q. Hoy" are listed. The article's lead sentence is: "Mathematicians and social scientists are increasingly being tapped to bring their knowledge to legal disputes and serve as expert witnesses".

AAAS
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE

GIVE RESOURCE CENTER PROGRAMS NEWS EVENTS MEMBER LOGIN JOIN

WHO WE ARE WHAT WE DO GET INVOLVED MEMBERSHIP

HOME | NEWS

Mathematicians and a Political Scientist Use Science to Improve the U.S. Voting System

14 February 2020
by: Anne Q. Hoy

“Mathematicians and social scientists are increasingly being tapped to bring their knowledge to legal disputes and serve as expert witnesses”

Politics : From Propaganda to Democracy

How Math Can Save Democracy




INSTITUTE FOR MATHEMATICS AND DEMOCRACY

2. Pay closer attention to "Plurality," "Ranked Choice Voting" (also known as "Instant Runoff" and "Condorcet Method." What could be their negative consequences or drawbacks?

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3. According to you, which would be the best method? Why?

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4. Assess the flaws of the different voting methods thanks to Alex Gendler's video "Which voting system is the best?" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PaVtCnaw_400s).



Plurality.....

Instant Runoff.....

Multiple Rounds.....

Condorcet Method.....

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5. The first end of the video alludes to "Arrow's Impossibility theorem." What could it consist in?

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6. Would you think about another social issue math could or should help redress?

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7. Solve these two voting problems.

In every round of a certain game show, n votes are cast by the public to decide which contestant(s) of n contestants continues to the next round. The contestant with the lowest amount of votes every round is eliminated. The next round proceeds with $n-1$ contestants, and so on. What is the maximum number of votes needed to guarantee that a contestant will proceed to the next round, assuming that he/she does not vote?

- n is updated at the start of every round to represent the number of remaining contestants.
- n may vary with each round.
- Every round, one contestant must be eliminated by voting, for/for, or rather/less.
- $n \geq 2$.

Answer :

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WHAT IS THE BEST RANKED VOTING METHOD?

(see the video for more details)

- **Plurality**
- **Instant runoff**
- **Ranked choice**
- **Condorcet method**

Instant runoff, Ranked choice, and Condorcet method are all better than plurality, but which is the **best**? (see the video for more details) For an in-depth analysis of a selection system (or system) consider the following ranked choice grids:

1st round: 2018
 2nd round: 2018
 3rd round: 2018
 4th round: 2018
 5th round: 2018
 6th round: 2018
 7th round: 2018
 8th round: 2018
 9th round: 2018
 10th round: 2018
 11th round: 2018
 12th round: 2018
 13th round: 2018
 14th round: 2018
 15th round: 2018
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 90th round: 2018
 91st round: 2018
 92nd round: 2018
 93rd round: 2018
 94th round: 2018
 95th round: 2018
 96th round: 2018
 97th round: 2018
 98th round: 2018
 99th round: 2018
 100th round: 2018

Answer :

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Calculate the winner using each of the following methods: plurality, instant runoff, for/for, and Condorcet method.

Politics : From Propaganda to Democracy

How Math Can Save Democracy



THE MATHEMATICS OF DEMOCRACY

WHAT IS

Plurality?

How it works:

The candidate who gets the most votes wins. This method is used in most US elections.

THE MATHEMATICS OF DEMOCRACY

WHAT IS

Approval Voting?

How it works:

Voters check any number of candidates they would be okay with being elected. The candidate with the most cumulative votes wins.

THE MATHEMATICS OF DEMOCRACY

WHAT IS

Ranked Choice Voting?

How it works:

Voters rank all candidates in order of preference. If there is a candidate with the majority of first-place votes, they are the winner. Otherwise the candidate with the fewest first-place votes is eliminated. The votes of those who had the eliminated candidate as their first choice are transferred to the next candidate in their rankings, and all the votes are counted again. This process is repeated until there is a majority winner.

Ranked choice voting is currently used in Maine and many cities/counties across the United States.

THE MATHEMATICS OF DEMOCRACY

WHAT IS

the Condorcet Method?

How it works:

This is a voting method where each voter ranks all the candidates. To calculate a winner, we look at one-on-one contests of each candidate: if more people ranked one candidate above the other, that candidate wins that pairwise contest.

The candidate who beats all the other candidates wins.

THE MATHEMATICS OF DEMOCRACY

WHAT IS

Borda Count?

How it works: This is a voting method where each voter ranks all the candidates. In an election with n candidates, a candidate gets $n-1$ points for each first-place vote, $n-2$ points for each second-place vote, and so on. Last place votes get 0 points. When all the points are added, the candidate with the most points wins.

THE MATHEMATICS OF DEMOCRACY

WHAT IS

Strategic Voting?

Strategic voting occurs when a voter's ballot does not match their true preference, often because they do not think their first choice candidate will win.

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How Math Can Save Democracy



WHAT IS

Plurality?

How it works: The candidate who gets the most votes wins. This method is used in most US elections.



3

WHAT IS

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How it works: Voters rank all candidates in order of preference. If there is a candidate with the majority of first-place votes, they are the winner. Otherwise the candidate with the fewest first-place votes is eliminated. The votes of those who had the eliminated candidate as their first choice are transferred to the next candidate in their rankings, and all the votes are counted again. This process is repeated until there is a majority winner.

Ballot: 1 2 3 4 5
A B C
B C A C B
C B C A A
C is eliminated
Ballot: 1 2 3 4 5
A B B B
B B A A A
Candidate B wins

Ranked choice voting is currently used in Maine and many cities/counties across the United States.

6

WHAT IS

Borda Count?

How it works: This is a voting method where each voter ranks all the candidates. In an election with n candidates, a candidate gets $n-1$ points for each first-place vote, $n-2$ points for each second-place vote, and so on. Last place votes get 0 points. When all the points are added, the candidate with the most points wins.

Points for A: $2 \times 1 + 1 \times 2 = 4$
Points for B: $2 \times 1 + 1 \times 0 = 2$
Points for C: $2 \times 1 + 1 \times 1 = 3$
A wins!

Ballot: 1 2 3
R C A
A A C
C B B

2

WHAT IS

Approval Voting?

How it works: Voters check any number of candidates they would be okay with being elected. The candidate with the most cumulative votes wins.

For example: A family is voting on what to have for dinner.



This voter is okay with either pizza or soup for dinner.

Candidates - Votes
• Pizza - 4
• Burgers - 1
• Soup - 2

The family will have pizza for dinner.

5

WHAT IS

the Condorcet Method?

How it works: This is a voting method where each voter ranks all the candidates. To calculate a winner, we look at one-on-one contests of each candidate: if more people ranked one candidate above the other, that candidate wins that pairwise contest.



The candidate who beats all the other candidates wins. A is the winner!

Ballot: 1 2 3
C B A
A A C
B C B

4

WHAT IS

Strategic Voting?

Strategic voting occurs when a voter's ballot does not match their true preference, often because they do not think their first choice candidate will win.

For example, say a family is choosing a flavor of ice cream using plurality. John and Sally love mint ice cream, but they hate vanilla. If they vote honestly, the votes look like:

vanilla - 4
chocolate - 3
mint - 2

If John and Sally vote dishonestly for chocolate, a more popular candidate, they won't get their first choice but they won't get their last choice either:

chocolate - 5
vanilla - 4
mint - 0

1

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INSTITUTE FOR MATHEMATICS AND DEMOCRACY

2. Pay closer attention to “Plurality,” “Ranked Choice Voting” (also known as “Instant Runoff”) and “Condorcet Method.” What could be their negative consequences or drawbacks?

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3. According to you, which would be the best method? Why?

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4. Assess the flaws of the different voting methods thanks to Alex Gendler’s video “Which voting system is the best?” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PaxVCsnox_4 00:00-05:05).



Plurality:.....

Instant Runoff:.....

Multiple Rounds:.....

Condorcet Method:.....


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How Math Can Save Democracy



4. Assess the flaws of the different voting methods thanks to Alex Gendler's video "Which voting system is the best?" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PaxVCsnox_4 00:00-05:05).



Plurality: a candidate may be chosen even though most think it is the worst.

Instant Runoff: in the example, the chosen candidate started out in second-to-last place and a majority ranked it among their two least preferred options.

Multiple Rounds: (the top two winners proceed to a separate runoff) encourages tactical voting and lying (skewing the votes in their favor)
Condorcet Method: may fail to select a winner

5. The very end of the video alludes to "Arrow's Impossibility theorem." What could it consist in?

(Video) It's possible that the voting methods deliver unfair results. Our intuitive concept of fairness contains a number of assumptions that may contradict each other. For any election with more than two options, it's impossible to design a voting system that doesn't violate at least some theoretically desirable criteria.

Arrow's Theorem says that no ranked choice voice is perfect. It's impossible to fulfill the three desirable features for a voting system (unanimity, no dictators, independence of irrelevant alternatives) at the same time in any ranked voting system.

6. Would you think about another social issue math could or should help redress?

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In every round of a certain game show, v votes are cast by the public to decide which contestants out of c contestants continue to the next round. The contestant with the lowest amount of votes in every round is eliminated. The next round proceeds with $c - 1$ contestants, and so on. What is the minimum number of votes needed to guarantee that a contestant will proceed to the next round, assuming that he/she does not forfeit?

- c is updated at the start of every round to represent the number of **remaining** contestants.
- v may vary with each round.
- Every round, one contestant must be eliminated by voting, forfeit, or tiebreaker.
- $c \geq 2$.

- $\frac{v}{2}$
- $\frac{v}{c}$
- $\frac{v}{2} + 1$
- $\frac{v}{c} + 1$

Answer :

WHAT IS *the best ranked voting method?*

So far, we've examined several ordinal voting methods:

- Plurality
- Instant runoff
- Borda count
- Condorcet method

Instant runoff, Borda count, and Condorcet method are all better than plurality, but which is the **fairest**? That depends on how we define "fair" and what aspects of an election we deem important.

Consider the following ranked choice profile:

Ballots:
of voters: 36 24 20 18 8 4

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | B | C | D | E | E |
| D | E | B | C | B | C |
| E | D | E | E | D | D |
| C | C | D | B | C | B |
| B | A | A | A | A | A |

Calculate the winner using each of the following methods: plurality, instant runoff, Borda count, and Condorcet method.

Answer :

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The correct answer is:

$$\frac{v}{c} + 1$$

$$\frac{v}{2}$$

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..... THE MATHEMATICS OF DEMOCRACY

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| | D | E | B | C | B | C |
| | E | D | E | E | D | D |
| | C | C | D | B | C | B |
| | B | A | A | A | A | A |

Calculate the winner using each of the following methods: plurality, instant runoff, Borda count, and Condorcet method.

No majority winner.

A is the plurality winner.

B is the runoff winner.

C is the instant runoff winner.

D is the Borda Count winner.

E is the Condorcet winner.

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How Math Can Save Democracy



INSTITUTE FOR MATHEMATICS AND DEMOCRACY

2. Pay closer attention to "Plurality," "Ranked Choice Voting" (also known as "Instant Runoff") and "Condorcet Method." What could be their negative consequences or drawbacks?

Plurality: A candidate can win even if more voters would have preferred NOT to elect them (plurality ≠ majority); encourages dishonest voting (if you think your favorite candidate cannot win) > not expressive enough, prone to vote splitting so a fringe candidate has a higher chance of winning; susceptible to the spoiler effect, where a candidate who has no chance of winning can flip an election if the votes are split fairly by pulling votes away from one contestant.

Instant Runoff: (video) the winner may never have been in a first position and may be part of the majority's least preferred options.

Condorcet method: Condorcet circle (it does not always produce a winner); a candidate does not have to be ranked first to win, they just have to be ranked higher > it produces a good compromise candidate, but fails to provide an incentive for candidates to be innovative or take a stand on controversial issues (the winner may simply be the least offensive).

3. According to you, which would be the best method? Why?

Approval voting is used by the American Mathematical Society, Mathematical Association of America, American Statistical Association, and Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics. It is not susceptible to strategic voting; it eliminates the spoiler effect and reduces the possibility of vote splitting, encouraging participation by smaller parties; it does not fall under the Arrow Impossibility Theorem since it is not a ranked choice method; but, an ay not be expressive enough as it is impossible to communicate which candidate you prefer the most.

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6. Would you think about another social issue math could or should help redress?

7. Solve these two voting problems.

In every round of a certain game show, n voters are asked by the public to decide which contestants out of n contestants continue to the next round. The contestant with the lowest amount of votes in every round is eliminated. The next round proceeds with $n-1$ contestants, and so on. What is the smallest number of voters needed to guarantee that a contestant will proceed to the next round, assuming that he/she does not forfeit?

- it is updated at the start of every round to represent the number of remaining contestants.
- Every round, one contestant must be eliminated by voting, forfeit, or otherwise.
- $n \geq 3$.

The correct answer is:

$$\frac{n}{2} + 1$$

WHAT IS the best ranked voting method?

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Consider the following ranked choice profile:

Let's look at the instant runoff winner: E has the least first-place votes, so E is removed, and the redistribution looks like:

Now D has the least first-place votes, so we get:

Finally, B is removed.

Since C ends with the most votes, C wins the instant runoff.

We could have also performed a simple runoff instead of instant runoff. Here, we only consider the two candidates with the most first-place votes and eliminate the rest. Therefore, we just look at A and B.

B wins the runoff with 74 out of 110 votes.

Using Borda Count, we give each candidate 4 points for every first-place vote, 3 points for every second-place vote, etc., and zero points for last place. The point totals are:

points for A: $36 \cdot 4 + 24 \cdot 0 + 20 \cdot 0 + 18 \cdot 0 + 8 \cdot 0 + 4 \cdot 0 = 144$

points for B: $36 \cdot 0 + 24 \cdot 4 + 20 \cdot 3 + 18 \cdot 1 + 8 \cdot 3 + 4 \cdot 1 = 202$

points for C: $36 \cdot 1 + 24 \cdot 1 + 20 \cdot 4 + 18 \cdot 3 + 8 \cdot 1 + 4 \cdot 3 = 214$

points for D: $36 \cdot 3 + 24 \cdot 2 + 20 \cdot 1 + 18 \cdot 4 + 8 \cdot 2 + 4 \cdot 2 = 272$

points for E: $36 \cdot 2 + 24 \cdot 3 + 20 \cdot 2 + 18 \cdot 2 + 8 \cdot 4 + 4 \cdot 4 = 268$

D wins the Borda Count.

For the Condorcet method, we try to find a candidate who wins against every opponent in a pairwise contest. We find that E wins over:

- A by a vote of 74-36
- B by a vote of 68-44
- C by a vote of 72-38
- D by a vote of 56-54

So E is the Condorcet winner.

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Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

Three desirable features for a voting system are as follows:

- **Unanimity:** If everyone prefers A to B , A should win.
- **No Dictators:** There should not be anyone whose individual preferences always determine who wins.
- **Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA):** Adding extra options should not make existing relations change. That is, if $A \geq B$, adding option C should not make $B \geq A$.

Independence of irrelevant alternatives is an important criterion since ideally a voting system will not be susceptible to **strategic voting**, in which voters will rank options in ways that do not reveal their true preferences so as to attempt to make sure their top choice is elected.

THEOREM

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

It is impossible to fulfill all of the three above features (Unanimity, No Dictators, IIA) at the same time in any ranked voting system.

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PROOF


Consider a vote with N voters and three options A , B , and C . In the diagram to the right, it is shown that given unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives, one of the voters must be a dictator [3].

If everyone individually votes B as the worst option, then by unanimity, B is the aggregate worst option. This is profile 0 in the diagram. Similarly, if everyone thinks B is the best option, then B is the aggregate best option. This is profile N . Between 0 and N are profiles i where the first i people vote B as best, and $N - i$ people vote B as worst. At one of these values, the aggregate ranking must switch so that B is the aggregate best. Let this switching value be k , the *pivotal voter* for B . If k ranks B first, then B wins, and if k ranks B last, then B does not win.

The rest of the proof demonstrates that, if unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives hold, then voter k always determines the outcome of the vote. That is, voter k is a dictator.

First, consider the case where k ranks A over C , and all other voters have some arbitrary ranking. Now, for k , move A to their first preference and B to their second. By IIA, this can't change the aggregate ranking of A versus C . Similarly, for voters 0 through $k - 1$, move B to their first preference, and for voters $k + 1$ through N , move B to their bottom preference. Again, by IIA, this can't change the ranking of A and C .

Now all voters 0 through k prefer A to B and all voters $k + 1$ through N prefer B to A . By the definition of k , that means the aggregate preference must be $A > B$. Similarly, all voters 0 through k prefer B to C and all voters $k + 1$ through N prefer C to B . By the definition of k , that means the aggregate preference must be $B > C$. By transitivity, the overall preference must be $A > C$. Therefore, k is a dictator. \square



Voter profiles and the resulting aggregate preferences [2].